On App Store as a Content Store

The implications of the new app transaction model are profound. To begin with, consider the following:

  • 10 MB limit – Devs can now get their apps under 10MB much more easily. This allows them to take advantage of users downloading over the carrier networks and not wi-fi. They can offer more content via in app purchase and make up the difference.
  • Rankings – It will be curious to see how Apple changes the rankings over time. “Top Paid” and “Top Free” just don’t really don’t make sense anymore with this model. Will they make “Top Freemium” or something equivalent?
  • Infrastructure – Developers have to deal with content delivery and updates to that content. Apple handles the transaction in the normal fashion and takes their 30% but then they leave it up to the developers to actually get the content to the iPhone. What if there is a bug in the content? The developer has to deal with making sure the user is notified of the update and then initiate the update.
  • Piracy – There has been a lot of talk about how this may help fight piracy but I think the numbers will tell a different story.
  • Apps as content – The deeper story relates to the transformation of the app store into a content store. I made that prediction a year ago but had no idea how it would happen. In the long term I expect Apple to merge the iTunes music/video content management system with the app store content management. This way you could buy music/video/books/games from within an app and have it available through your iTunes UI.
  • Addiction – “Apping” as the activity of using iPhone apps has come to be known, is already something that did not exist a year ago but has proven to be wildly useful/common/profitable. Only a year has passed and we are already in the realm of uncharted waters.


Comes With Trouble

I can’t believe this.
http://musically.com/blog/2009/10/15/comes-with-music-107k-users-worldwide/

For kicks, I looked up what I wrote about Comes With Music (CWM) a year ago:

Trouble Comes With Music By Horace Dediu on October 3, 2008 12:18 PM
The troubles that CWM will face:
The model is complex and the value prop is convoluted with users discouraged from making informed purchase decisions.
CWM is firmly embedded in a value network that is in the final stages of disruption. Profits have evaporated and participants are in a state of defensive rigidity that prevents investment in innovative business models.
To some buyers (esp. parents who will pay), the concept may sound more like “music sold as hardware” than “hardware loaded with music”. Music sold as hardware is what the CD is/was but this new hardware is bound to wither away and become disposable in a year, PC copies notwithstanding (as transfers between PCs are limited). Therefore, the limitations of perishable music persist and comparisons to durable media are unfavorable.
Competitiveness with pirated music is often cited as the goal. The means to that goal is the advantage of having “unlimited” content available vs. “60,000 songs on your hard drive”. The unstated assumption is that new music is always more desirable over a rich, but dated back catalog. Long tail theory says that’s not true for an increasingly larger group of consumers.
Finally, the bet is that users will upgrade devices as if they were a subscription. This becomes “music sold as hardware subscriptions”. As “music as a subscription” has not taken off, it does not bode well. One reason is that subscribed music is hired for a different job than owned music–one of discovery and casual listening–a job we used to hire Radio for. A job that is now obsolete in the era of social networking.

Nokia’s official comments one year hence:

the official blog on which Nokia is celebrating CWM’s first birthday acknowledges: “Sure, it didn’t start out that rosy, with lots of folk not really certain about what Comes With Music offered … we never shied away from the important education process that is needed in order to fathom that you can download and forever-keep as many tracks as you like – but the past 365 days have seen a much greater understanding and appreciation for the service emerge.”

Subs numbers:

  • UK – 32,728 (launch date: Oct 08)
  • Singapore – 19,318 (Feb 09)
  • Australia – 23,003 (Mar 09)
  • Brazil – 10,809 (Apr 09)
  • Sweden – 1,101 (Apr 09)
  • Italy – 691 (Apr 09)
  • Mexico – 16,344 (May 09)
  • Germany – 2,673 (May 09)
  • Switzerland – 560 (Jun 09)

For comparison: Spotify has 6 million users and iTunes has 120 million registrations.


Pink Cheeks

The decision process regarding mobility at Microsoft from 2005 has been a classic example of paralysis by analysis. Trapped by their processes and resources into doing horizontal solutions for a world that buys vertical integration, Microsoft was bound to fall into a trap. Like a wounded beast, it is not dying predictably but with spasms. Rather than concluding that Pink and Zune are part of a fucked up process or evolution, they should be seen as terminal convulsions of WinMo.

Credit to Dilger for going further than anyone in tying Pink, WinMo and Zune.

If I may summarize, the problems Microsoft faces are:

  • A reliance on a horizontal business model at a time when modular product “turns” are not fast enough vs. integrated/vertical models. Just look at Dilger’s mobile OS history graph and measure the “cycle time” of each product rev for the competitors.
  • An economic model that implies there is value in a mobile OS (something PalmSource and Symbian figured out to be dead ends long ago, not to mention OpenWave, SavaJe and a few others long forgotten.) Microsoft, a company that grew by disruption at the low end (vis. Lotus, Novell, IBM, etc.,) is unable or uncaring enough to sense when it’s being disrupted the same way.
  • Competitors that combine into a pincer movement from above (Apple) and below (Google) with a fortified alternative incumbent (Nokia, Microsoft’s original target) still standing. Unlike previous single competitors in each category Microsoft conquered, the mobile world presented a more diverse (and perhaps wiser) front.

I won’t get into Microsoft’s dysfunctional culture as that’s been covered brilliantly by others.


Windows Immobile

John Herrman reviews the new Windows Mobile 6.5 for Gizmodo:

To put it another way, handset manufacturers have done more in the last two years to improve Windows Mobile than Microsoft has, which borders on pathetic. In the time since Windows Mobile 6.0 came out in February of 2007, Apple has released the iPhone — three times. Palm has created the Pre, with its totally new webOS. Android has come into being, and grown into something wonderful. RIM has created a touch phone and a revamped BlackBerry OS. For these companies, the world has changed.

And Microsoft? They eked out some performance enhancements and a new homescreen in 6.1, and executed a gaudy facelift for 6.5. This is what they’ve done to Windows Mobile.

The review from Gizmodo concludes:

I’d like to think that 6.5’s stunning failure to innovate is a symptom of a neglected project—maybe Microsoft just needed something, anything to hold people over until the mythical Windows Mobile 7 comes out, whatever it is. But as Steve Ballmer himself has plainly admitted, it’s worse: Microsoft has simply lumbered in the wrong direction for two years, letting everyone, save maybe Nokia, fly right past them.

John Gruber adds:

Microsoft’s irrelevance in today’s mobile space is nothing short of a spectacular failure. Worse than the mere fact that Windows Mobile 6.5 is a total turd is that no one is surprised, and no one cares.

I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again: Microsoft will take 4 to 6 years to respond to the iPhone. Nearly 3 years have already passed and indications are that Windows 7 will ship in devices by end of 2010. I expect another 2 years hence will be needed to polish it.

Nokia will take at least as long, though probably longer.

Neither response will be sufficient or effective. Curiously perhaps, throughout this time both Nokia and Microsoft will use each other as benchmarks of competitiveness.


Android Fantasies

http://adage.com/digitalnext/article?article_id=139414

“Three Reasons Android Could Terminate Apple Despite the Hype, iPhone Isn’t the Only Mobile Platform in Town”

All three reasons he cites apply to the incumbents Windows Mobile, Symbian and Palm OS of old PalmSource. Android therefore is a symmetric response to the incumbents whereas iPhone is an asymmetric response. To suggest that Android has a chance to defeat iPhone implies that the incumbents do as well. If the incumbents do have a chance, why would they not destroy Android as they have vastly greater resources in a symmetric match-up? (Incumbents always win sustaining battles).

His argument depends on Google “being better”. History suggests that resource-based matches always benefit the incumbent.


Blurry Moto

Earlier today, Motorola unveiled MOTOBLUR, a mobile social media OS of sorts that runs on top of Google Android. The company plans to introduce its first MOTOBLUR handset – CLIQ (and an international version called DEXT) – before the holidays

The assumption underlying this product is that “social networking” as it exists today is a job that people are specifically hiring devices to help them do. There are several problems with this assumption:

  • SN is rapidly evolving. As any new medium, it takes several iterations before it’s “good enough” to solve the underlying problems. Whatever emerges (twittering, fb, or as yet unknown) will be a moving target. Users are moving quickly between these services. Assumptions about value of “stickiness” based on the social graph are proving to be flawed.
  • SN is not a “job” per se. SN is a means by which people communicate and try to get something done in their lives (i.e. getting a job, getting laid, suppressing loneliness, etc.) SN will compete with various other emergent technologies that solve these underlying jobs. These disruptors could be gaming metaphors, media-centric packages, virtual spaces, etc.

Therefore building a hardware product that is positioned and intertwined with SN is highly risky.

By the way, about 1.5 years ago Nokia considered doing the same thing. SN was on everyone’s mind as the next big thing, just like email was 2 years before that. These service fads come and go. It’s no surprise that one product development cycle later the devices are emerging even though the value of the service has rapidly evolved in new directions. This points out the fact that you can’t make hardware dev cycles match service/software dev cycles. The only way to play this from a hardware perspective is with a platform approach e.g. iPhone. Let the ecosystem solve the job to be done and collect rents. I’m always surprised that this lesson from the 90s is still being forgotten by the device guys. BTW, I understand the NOK Solutions logic a bit better. It is not a major departure from the track NOK is on now. The power base remains with devices, as it has for 15 years or more.

On another level, MOT is a going concern issue right now. The approach with CLIQ is, by definition, niche. I don’t see the product as broadly attractive solving MOT cash flow issues. If they sell more than 2 million units, I’d be surprised. (note: N97 got to 2 million on the back of massive distribution power but SE Xperia did not cross 1 million and Pre will struggle to get to 2 million.) The “bet” on Android is weak and not a bet really on anything correlated to earnings growth.


Putting Nokia Back Together

So Dell is making Android mobile phones while Nokia is making Windows PCs. A curious confluence of poor management decisions.

Why is all this dilution of core competence happening? Average punditry would suggest it’s all about “convergence” and the overlapping of mobile and until-recently-fixed computing.

Er, not quite.

The economics of plastic bits shipped in cardboard boxes has not changed. It’s as lousy a business as it has always been, whether the plastic bits are small or large. Some would argue that the gross margins of mobile devices are higher than those of computers, but that’s not true on average. The gross margin on average mobile phones is just as low (<10%) as it is on PCs. There are about the same number of competitors and rivalry and global marketplace.

If indeed, margins were the only story, why would Nokia choose to chase the low margin PC business while holding (albeit very tentatively) 50% global share in “smartphones”? Similarly, why would RIMM choose to chase the low end consumer business (link: Blackberry Pearl et. al.) while having the fat margins of thinly penetrated business devices to wallow in? Finally, why would there be hundreds (literally link: www.pdadb.net) Windows Mobile smartphone licensees, the vast majority of which don’t manage to sell more than the 50k minimum volume licenses they are obliged to order?

The fact of the matter is that the money being chased by device vendors is not being paid for devices, but for the service plans those devices enable. More precisely, these businesses are concerned with capturing a share of ARPU uplift from mobile data services. As such, they are mostly offering hardware as enticements for the *change* in ARPU that mobile broadband creates. Success depends on the power of that hardware to compel users to switch to higher data service fees.

The first proponent in his “hardware as ARPU booster” was actually Microsoft back in 2003 when they entered the mobile OS market. One of their value propositions was that Windows Mobile would boost data ARPU. The reality was not so compelling however as WinMo turned out to be too awkward to use for most users and the power of the platform lay fallow. In reality, the first successful hardware ARPU booster was RIM. In the middle of this decade, RIM showed that a Blackberry user could be worth between $5000 and $8000 in NPV ARPU to an operator. For that juicy pie, RIM was handsomely rewarded with a small “cut” that boosted their margins to above 50% making them the most profitable device vendor on the planet.

The realization only began to set in about 2007 as every other vendor began applying resources to deliver ARPU boosters. Apple took note early and executed beautifully with the iPhone, mastering the “get paid for ARPU” game, and in the process capturing 50%+ gross margins and (depending on the quarter) up to 30% of all profits in the device industry.

To forecast how this game will be played and how sustainable this boosterism is, we need to segment or categorize the market according to ARPU. The way to visualize this is what I call the “wedding cake” model. Each cake layer represents the population of users in that ARPU segment and the thickness of that layer represents the delta of ARPU to the layer below.

  • The base layer is huge (billions of customers) and represents the prepaid voice market. The average “thickness” of this layer is about $10/mo.
  • The next layer is smaller and represents the postpaid voice market. The thickness is about $30, representing the “boost” over prepaid.
  • The next layer is smaller still and represents the postpaid voice+data market where the data is a-la-carte. This is typical of plans where the buyer pays separately for certain data services (e.g. email, navigation, etc.) and pays on a per-megabyte basis for browsing. The ARPU differential is about $20.
  • Finally the top layer is the unlimited data plan packaged with bucket voice and SMS. Here the ARPU differential is another $30.

At its highest, the cake is about $100/mo., though the width of the top layer and hence the population of paying customers at that price point is quite small relative to the other layers.

Now each layer is covered with a “frosting” which is the device hardware revenue. Obviously the frosting gets a bit thicker the higher the layer, but it’s a relatively thin layer compared to the “cake” thickness. In the higher layers the trend is in fact to make the frosting as thin as possible (<$99 NPV or <$4/mo. for a 24 mo. contract.) The devices which enable the top layers are clearly more complex and expensive to make, but the end-user pricing is trending down. The trick is therefore to convince the operators to pay a piece of the “cake” to the device vendor in exchange for migrating users to these higher layers.


Nokia Quarterly Results

Nokia’s latest quarterly results and forecast caused a 15% drop in the share price on a day when the S&P rose by about 1%. The drop was the largest single day change in the company’s valuation since 2004. The cause for the drop was not macroeconomics or performance in the previous quarter, but the guidance provided.

The shock was in an unchanged low margin and a flat market share. Both of these measures of performance were expected to improve as the overall market improved. What Nokia is saying, in effect, is that it will perform no better than the market average. Naturally, its value should therefore be no higher than the market average.

The trouble is that the “market” for mobile phones is abysmally free of value and hence of profits. Taking the sum of profits for all the major incumbents (Nokia, Samsung, LG, Sony Ericsson and Motorola) we find that net profits for the entire industry are, at best, flimsy, at worst, negligible. But this begs another question: why is value missing in mobile devices–a market that seems to be growing faster than almost any other technology market?

First a few facts:

  • Focusing only on Devices & Services, Nokia did make a net profit of EUR763 million on sales of 103.2 million phones. That’s EUR 7.39 average operating profit per phone. In Q1 Nokia Devices made about EUR 6 per phone, so a slight improvement, but down from about EUR 20 a year ago.
  • Sony Ericsson entered its fourth quarter of losses.
  • Motorola entered its 9th consecutive quarter of losses.
  • Samsung and LG are at about break-even.

So if one were to look at the incumbents, the ~1 billion phones they sell a year seem to be generating barely EUR2 per phone, most of it in the hands of Nokia.

The exceptions are, of course, the entrants RIM and Apple with EUR 60 and EUR 120 profits respectively per phone, orders of magnitude above average.

Nokia seems to be the best of a bad lot. Can Nokia expect to join the entrant cohort or sink with the incumbents? Answering this question forces us to go through a deep examination of what correlates with value in the new device market.


Assessing Nokia’s Competitive Response


When the iPhone was announced in January 2007 I tried to envision the competitive response from Nokia. The method involved some knowledge of the product development cycle that I was faintly aware of.

Here is what I predicted:

  • 2007.There would be no response within the first year, meaning there would be no perceived threat of any kind. No process change, No roadmap changes and no business review. Apple is not considered a competitor.
  • 2008.There would be plans made to respond with press releases, dismissing the challenge as a non-threatening “positive” for the industry. No process changes, no product plan changes, no business model changes. Apple would not be considered a competitor except in “high end multimedia” (invisible in any of the segments Nokia uses to define markets).
  • 2009.In the third year, product development teams would be asked to begin roadmapping some of the hardware features that would keep Nokia ostensibly competitive (unfortunately for Nokia, hardware is not what sells iPhones). Results from these efforts would emerge in 18 to 24 months. Apple not considered a competitor except in “high end converged devices” (i.e. a few consumer segments/categories are considered vulnerable).
  • 2010.Realization that iPhone is a threat from new dimensions (user experience). Planning begins on reshaping the software base as a market-driven (not technology-driven) asset (5 year cycle). Apple begins to be evaluated as a competitor in devices and services, although still not compliant with current market definitions.
  • 2011.The realization that the iPhone competes as a platform. Planning begins on repositioning Symbian/Ovi. Products planned in 2009 begin shipping–this means first capacitive touch screens but crude, almost unusable software.
  • 2012.The realization that the iPhone is an integrated product and that integration is a key to competitiveness enters management consciousness. Planning begins on organizational change and a realignment of incentives to account for this new threat. Crude shuffling of internal assets and management musical chairs begins. Organizational change amounts to mostly new names for old departments. Touch screen phones with slightly better software begin shipping (similar in feel to Blackberry Storm from 2008). Incentives are added for employees (in across-the-board performance objectives) to hit user experience targets.
  • 2013.Management begins planning a new organization structure that takes into consideration the fundamental causes of iPhone’s success: integration, software, user experience over the objections of sales and markets org that depends on shipping plastic to distributor. Another reorganization that is slightly more rational and aligned with the market is initiated. The plan is to have the assets in place by 2019 to compete effectively as a platform.
  • 2014.First products that are roughly comparable with iPhone version 1 begin shipping. The required software redesign started in 2010 is coupled with the integration efforts. Nokia’s response to the iPhone has begun.

I tried to revisit the prediction to update it with anecdotal evidence but so far there has been little activity that has affected the trajectory.

  1. Note 1: Whether an iPhone v1.0 shipping in 2014 would be competitive is left as an exercise to the reader.
  2. Note 2: The N97 shipping in 2009 is the result of work begun in 2007, it has had no influence at all from the iPhone.
  3. Note 3: The Microsoft response cycle is slightly shorter (perhaps 5 years vs. 7) but they lose a year in efforts to integrate with licensees. As neither MSFT nor GOOG are able to integrate products, they will never be able to actually deliver a competitive product. In this regard, Nokia has an advantage.
  4. Note 4: The key takeaway from this analysis is that the industry standard product cycle for an integrated, platform based product is 5 to 8 years and if one competitor can achieve a 2 to 3 year cycle, then the more nimble competitor can “turn inside” the industry and, within two cycles, dominate it. Although smaller competitors are able to turn product faster, they are usually unable to sustain the platform heavy lifting (which takes an order of magnitude more effort/assets).


Asymco

Asymmetric Competition

Skip to content ↓